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FINANCING INVENTORY AND PROCEEDS UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE*
by Ray D. Henson**
I. INTRODUCTION
Isaac Newton said, "If I have been able to see farther, it is
because I stood on the shoulders of giants."1 Newton could not
have made his scientific discoveries-indeed, we would never have
heard of Newton- had he merely looked at the giants of the past,
had he merely accepted what others had done without examining
it anew and building on it. If we accept old thinking "on faith," if
we blindly adhere to old doctrines without making a fresh reap-
praisal and questioning their validity, we cannot progress scien-
tifically, legally, intellectually. Our ideas need to be laundered
occasionally in "cynical acid.' 2
The adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code8 provides an
excellent opportunity to re-examine the function and use of secured
transactions. Admittedly what was handled traditionally as a
chattel mortgage transaction can probably be handled in the same
mechanical way under the Code, including the use of the same
forms, although the effect of some provisions in old forms might
be different under the Code. But in more intricate secured trans-
*The author wishes to express his appreciation to the staff of the Ne-
braska Law Review and in particular to Mr. Lloyd Hoppner for research
into earlier Nebraska judicial decisions in the areas covered by this
article. Because there have been so few decisions in this area and almost
all of these are so old as not to be pertinent in the context of present
business and legal practices, it does not appear that it would be helpful
to cite them. Nebraska statutes which are specifically repealed by the
UNFOmW COMMERCIAL CODE are listed in § 10-102(1) of the Nebraska
Code, and Nebraska statutes which prevail over the Code, in the event
of conflict, are listed in § 9-203 (2).
** B.S., 1947, LL.B. 1949, University of Illinois; Illinois State Bar Associa-
tion; American Bar Association (Chairman, Committee on the Uniform
Commercial Code, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law;
Member, Advisory Committee for the Corporate Debt Financing Project,
American Bar Foundation); American Law Institute (Member, Subcom-
mittee on Secured transaction of the Permanut Editorial Board for the
Uniform Commercial Code); American Judicature Society; Scribes;
Royal Institute of Philosophy (England); Editor, LATnDAms OF LAW
(Harper & Brothers, 1960); Counsel, Continental Assurance and Con-
tinental Casualty Companies, Chicago, Illinois.
'Quoted in KoESTLER, THE SLEEPWALKERS 353 (1959).
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actions, such as inventory financing, when the parties agree on
what they want to do, their contractual arrangement can now be
legally effectuated.
While it is possible to approach the Code from the categorized
miscellany of pre-Code security devices, with an explanation of how
easily the same results can be reached under the Code, it is perhaps
simpler to explain that a security interest can be created and
perfected in certain kinds of collateral in certain ways, quite
regardless of whether or how that collateral could have been used
as security before the Code. A new generation of law students
will certainly approach the field in this way and will doubtless not
miss the nonsensical, technical rules applicable to the various
devices which an older generation has learned-or not learned,
at its peril.
This is not to say that Article 9 of the Code does not contain
technical rules or that it can be understood in a quick glance.
Article 9 covers a great range of transactions and requires the most
careful study, but there is no comparison between the Code's
coverage of the gamut of secured transactions and the multiplicity
of security devices before the Code. Moreover, most of the difficult
2See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAnv. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897). For
recent evidence that the Nebraska Supreme Court is willing to take a
new view of reasonably established procedures-and to act on this
view without regard to the probable consequences to the state's economy
-see Elder v. Doerr, 175 Neb. 483, 122 N.W. 2d 528 (1963); Stanton v.
Mattson, 175 Neb. 767, 123 N.W. 2d 844 (1963).
3 Citations to the UNwom COnWERCIL CODE (hereinafter referred to
as U.C.C.) will be to the 1958 Official Text With Comments, as adopted
by the Legislature of Nebraska in 1963. There are Nebraska changes
from the 1958 Official Text in §§ 1-201(26), 9-302(3)(b), 9-401(1).
§ 9-403(6) has been added. § 9-407 has been omitted. On the back-
ground of the Code, see Schnader, The New Movement Toward
Uniformity in Commercial Law-The Uniform Commercial Code
the background of the Code, see Schnader, The New Movement Toward
Marches On, 13 Bus. LAw. 646 (1958); Malcolm, The Uniform Com-
merical Code: Review, Assessment, Prospect-November, 1959, 15 Bus.
LAw. 348 (1960); Davenport, An Introduction to the Illinois Uniform
Commercial Code, 50 ILL. B. J. 20 (1961). On the operation of the Code,
see Malcolm & Funk, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts Experience Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 Bus. LAW. 525 (1961).
4 "This Article applies to security interests created by contract including
pledge, assignment, chattel mortgage, chattel trust, trust deed, factor's
lien, equipment trust, conditional sale, trust receipt, other lien or title
retention contract and lease or consignment intended as security."
U.C.C. § 9-102 (2). In general, when goods are shipped "on consignment"
to a buyer for resale, the requirements of Article 9 must be met or the
goods are subject to claims of the buyer's creditors. U.C.C. § 2-326.
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questions in Article 9 are priority questions involving conflicting
security interests in the same collateral-problems which no prior
statute even attempted to solve. The basic rules for creating and
perfecting security interests are readily understandable, and in the
normal course of events-indeed, our economy would collapse if it
were otherwise-one need go no further, although there are detailed
provisions governing what happens on default.
This paper is concerned, basically, only with financing inven-
tory and the proceeds which arise on the sale of inventory. It must
be borne in mind that some of the rules discussed are only ap-
plicable in this context, and some of the problems could not arise
in any other field of secured transactions.
II. SCOPE OF ARTICLE 9
Article 9 governs all consensual security interests in inventory
and proceeds. It also governs sales of accounts, contract rights, and
chattel paper; 5 the only exceptions are (1) a sale of accounts, con-
tract rights, or chattel paper as part of the business out of which
they arose and (2) an assignment of accounts, contract rights, or
chattel paper for the purpose of collection only.6 The reason for
covering sales as well as assignments of these three kinds of col-
lateral is that it is often difficult to tell which kind of transaction
is involved. In general, it does not matter. The only distinction the
Code makes between such sales and assignments is on default.
If a sale is involved, the debtor is not liable for a deficiency or
entitled to a surplus, on a disposition of the collateral, unless the
agreement so provides, whereas on an assignment of security
he is so liable or entitled, as the case may be.7
The Code's definition of inventory is broader than the common
denotation of the term. Goods are inventory if they are held for
sale or lease or to be furnished under contracts of service or if
they have been so furnished, or if the goods are raw materials, work
in process, or materials used or consumed in a business.8 The term
would include automobiles held for lease rather than sale, as well
as replacement parts and gasoline and oil kept in reserve for use
in servicing the cars. In the case of a dress manufacturer, for
example, the term includes not only the end product of dresses
held for sale but also the fabrics and thread and ornamentation
acquired as raw materials, and the goods at every point in the
5U.C.C. § 9-102(1).
6U.C.C. § 9-104(f).
7 U.C.C. § 9-504(2).
8U.C.C. § 9-109(4).
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manufacturing process. It would be possible for a financer (who
might be the seller) of ornamentation to be used on dresses to claim
a continuing security interest in the ornamentation9 or an interest
in the dresses as products of the particular collateral. 10 In other
words, the financer of a manufacturer may claim a continuing
security interest from the time the raw material is furnished
through the manufacturing process into the finished product. When
the inventory is sold to a buyer in the ordinary course of business,
the buyer will take free of the security interest, which then con-
tinues in the identifiable proceeds of the sale.' 2
III. THE SECURITY INTEREST
A. ATTAcHmNT AD PERFECTION
How does the security interest in inventory arise? Here two
Code concepts require examination. First, the Code states that a
security interest attaches to collateral when (1) there is agree-
ment that it attach, (2) value is given, and (3) the debtor has rights
in the collateral. 3 These events may occur in any order. Second,
perfection is normally required for the security interest to be
good against third parties.' 4 In most cases, perfection requires an
additional step beyond attachment. Perfection may be accomplished
by a physical transfer of possession of the collateral in some cases,'I
or simply by attachment in some instances, 6 but usually a security
interest is perfected by filing a financing statement in the ap-
propriate office. 7
9U.C.C. § 9-314.
10 U.C.C. § 9-315.
"U.C.C. § 9-307(l).
12 U.C.C. § 9-306 (2).
13U.C.C. § 9-204(1). The agreement may be oral in the case of a pledge
of collateral. Otherwise it must be in writing; it must contain a de-
scription of the collateral; and, it must be signed by the debtor if the
agreement is to be enforceable against the debtor or third parties. See
The American Card Co. v. The H. M. H. Company, 196 A.2d 150(R.I. 1963); U.C.C. § 9-203. "Agreement" is defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(3).
14U.C.C. § 9-301(1).
15U.C.C. §§ 9-302(1) (a), 9-304(1), 9-305.
16U.C.C. §§ 9-302(1) (b), (c), (d).
17U.C.C. § 9-302(1). As to the place of filing, compare U.C.C. § 9-401(1)
with its counterpart in the Nebraska Uniform Commercial Code. Be-
cause the Nebraska filing provisions appear to be unworkable in part,
no effort will be made here to state the proper place of filing to perfect
secured transactions in Nebraska. The entire scheme of the Nebraska
§ 9-401 (1) is designed for tangible collateral, particularly goods,
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The term "perfection" is used in several different senses in
the Code. It never means less than a security interest which is good
against lien creditors-that is, an interest perfected in the bank-
ruptcy sense. But, of course, there may be conflicting perfected
security interests in the same collateral, which has always been
possible. In the case of a purchase money security interest in con-
sumer goods, the interest is perfected when it attaches, without
any filing. But, if there is no filing and the consumer sells to a
neighbor who buys in good faith and pays value, the neighbor will
take free of the security interest.18 Similarly, a perfected security
interest in inventory, accomplished by filing, will normally be cut
and cannot satisfactorily accommodate intangible collateral where the
debtor is a nonresident. The Nebraska Code also introduces a new term,
"security instrument," which is unnecessary and undefined. It is im-
possible to tell whether this term is intended to be synonymous with
"financing statement" or "security agreement." Moreover, there is a
conflict between U.C.C. § 9-103(3) and the portion of Nebraska §
9-401(1) covering the situation where the debtor is a nonresident and
the collateral is not in Nebraska "at the time of the execution of the
security instrument but the debtor intends to immediately bring it into
and keep it in" Nebraska. (Emphasis added). And in the case of a non-
resident debtor, where do you file if the collateral is not in existence
when the "security instrument" is executed? And where the debtor
is a nonresident and the collateral is kept in seven counties but a
financing statement is filed in only two counties, what is the effect?
The Nebraska provision in terms covers this situation only where filing
is in one county. And suppose an Iowa partnership does business in a
number of counties in Nebraska and designates a principal place of
business in one financing statement, duly filed, which no other creditor
or lender might reasonably suppose to be its principal place of business.
The Nebraska Code says this designation is controlling, which is satis-
factory between the secured party and debtor in the particular transac-
tion, but what of later creditors and secured parties? These problems
and others which will be apparent from a close reading of the Nebraska
filing provisions illustrate why a complicated uniform act should be
enacted uniformly and without local variations. On this matter gen-
erally, see Haydock, Certainty and Convenience-Criteria for the Place
of Filing Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 3 B.C. IND. & CoM. L.
REV. 179 (1962).
However the problem of where to file is resolved, if a financing
statement states a maturity date of five years or less, it is effective until
the maturity date plus sixty days; if it states no maturity date or
one in excess of five years, it is effective for five years. The secured
party may file a continuation statement before the end of the effective
period, and the effectiveness of the original financing statement will be
continued for another five years. There is no limit on the number of
continuation statements that may be filed. If none is filed, the security
interest lapses. U.C.C. §§ 9-403(2), (3).
Is U.C.C. § 9-307(2).
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off when the goods are sold to a buyer in the ordinary course of
business.19
Clearly, the concept of perfection is of primary importance in
inventory financing. It is inconceivable that inventory financing of
any consequence would take place without the filing of a financing
statement (and a search of the records) before any faunds are
initially advanced by the secured party to the debtor. It is thus
possible that filing will precede the occurrence of one or more of
the events necessary for attachment, in which case perfection oc-
curs when the last of the events necessary for attachment and
perfection has taken place.20
The reason why filing should precede the secured party's giving
of value (or, where the seller is retaining a security interest in the
goods, the buyer's acquisition of rights in the goods) is the pos-
sibility of conflicting interests in the financed inventory.
B. PURCHASE MoNEY FINANCING
A financer of inventory is either a purchase money financer or
he is not. He is a purchase money financer if (1) he is a seller who
retains a security interest or (2) he makes advances or otherwise
gives value to enable the debtor to acquire the collateral, if the
value is in fact used for such purpose.2 '
If he is a purchase money financer and if he files before or
within ten days after the collateral comes into the debtor's pos-
session, he takes priority over the rights of a transferee in bulk or
of a lien creditor which arise between the time the security interest
attaches and the time of filing.22 To take priority over a conflicting
security interest in the same collateral, the purchase money-financer
must (1) have a perfected security interest when the debtor gets
possession of the collateral, (2) notify any secured party who filed
as to the same kind of inventory prior to the filing by the purchase
money financer, or who was otherwise known to be financing such
inventory, that the purchase money financing is about to take place
before the debtor gets the collateral, and (3) the notice must state
that the notifier has or expects to acquire a purchase money interest
in the debtor's inventory, described by item or type.23 If these
19U.C.C. § 9-307(1).
2OU.C.C. § 9-303(1).
21 U.C.C. § 9-107.
22U.C.C. § 9-301(2).
23U.C.C. § 9-312(3). This provision very effectively prevents one fi-
nancer from tying up all of a particular debtor's financing.
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simple steps are followed, the purchase money financer will take
priority over any conflicting claims to the collateral. (Purchase
money financers of collateral other than inventory take priority
over conflicting security interests in the same collateral if they
file before or within ten days after the debtor gets possession of
the collateral.) 24
C. PRIoarI
In situations not covered by the purchase money rules, priority
is determined (1) in the order of filing if both interests are per-
fected by filing,25 (2) in the order of perfection, where both are not
perfected by filing,26 and (3) in the order of attachment, so long as
neither is perfected.27 Since it is hardly likely that any litigation
could arise without one or both parties filing, situation (3) can be
eliminated in inventory financing. It is, however, possible for a
security interest in inventory to arise under a field warehousing
arrangement where filing is not required to perfect a security
interest, although it is one means of perfection.28 But, in most
24U.C.C. § 9-312(4).
25 U.C.C. § 9-312 (5) (a). It should be borne in mind that where there are
potential or actual conflicts between secured parties, they may enter
into a subordination agreement. U.C.C. § 9-316.
20 U.C.C. § 9-312 (5) (b).
27 U.C.C. § 9-312 (5) (c).
28 Where goods are in the possession of a bailee who has not issued a
negotiable document for them, a security interest may be perfected in
any one of three ways: (1) by the issuance of a document in the name
of the secured party; (2) by the bailee's receipt of notification of the
secured party's interest (as to "notification," see U.C.C. § 1-201(26),(27); the Nebraska variation in (26) may present some problems here);
or (3) by filing as to the goods. U.C.C. § 9-304(3). Where goods are
represented by a negotiable document, an interest in the goods can be
perfected only by perfecting an interest in the document. U.C.C. §
9-304(2). The only effective means of perfecting an interest in a
negotiable document, as against purchasers and other secured parties,
is by taking possession for, while perfection by filing is permitted,
filing is not notice of the security interest, and a holder to whom a
negotiable document has been duly negotiated takes priority over an
earlier security interest, even though perfected. U.C.C. §§ 9-304(1),
9-309. It should be noted here that a security interest in a negotiable
document is perfected without filing or taking possession for 21 days
from the time it attaches, to the extent it arises for new value given
under a written security agreement. Where the secured party has a
perfected security interest in a negotiable document or in goods in the
possession of a bailee who has not issued a negotiable document for
them, the interest remains perfected for 21 days without filing where
the secured party makes the goods or documents available to the debtor
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cases, conflicting interests will probably be perfected by filing;29
it is thus advisable for the financer to file himself and then search
the records to be sure no one has filed before him on the same kind
of collateral. If both have filed, the first to file will prevail even
though the second filer gives value against the collateral before
the first does. The matter of priorities can become complicated, par-
ticularly if hypothetical examples of virtually impossible situations
are used. The entire matter is not necessarily beyond the scope
of this paper, but it will not be treated at any greater length be-
cause, if the proper steps are taken, as they will be in almost all
instances, the questions are academic. The point to remember is
the effect of filing.
D. THE SEcuarr- AGREEME
The security agreement, which states the arrangement between
the parties, may be filed if it meets the simple requirements of the
Code.3 0 The general practice in Code states is to file a short financ-
for the purpose of sale or exchange or manufacturing, etc. U.C.C. §§
9-304(4), (5). It is obvious that if goods, in which there is a temporary,
21-day perfected interest but as to which no financing statement is
filed, are put into a warehouse and a negotiable receipt obtained
priority over the earlier secured. party having a temporary, 21-day
perfected security interest. U.C.C. §§ 9-309, 9-312(1). The result
would be the same if the first secured party filed as to the goods and
the debtor subsequently obtained a negotiable document representing
them which he, fraudulently, pledged with a second financer. These
are, of course, credit risks. A more interesting question arises when a
purchase-money secured party, whose interest is perfected by filing,
releases goods to the debtor who then deposits them in a warehouse
which issues a nonnegotiable receipt in the name of a third party.
Which party wins? Under U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (b), where both interests
are not perfected by filing, the first to perfect has priority, so that the
first secured party here wins. This result will be surprising, perhaps,
to lenders who feel justified in relying on receipts issued in their names,
but it clearly is required by the Code. This issue has apparently arisen
only once, on more elaborate facts, in an arbitration proceeding, The
Philadelphia National Bank (Assignee) v. Irving R. Boody & Co. (1963),
in which Carl W. Funk of Philadelphia was arbitrator. See Funk, Trust
Receipt vs. Warehouse Receipt which Prevails when they cover the
same goods? 19 Bus. LAw 627 (1964).
29But note the possible exceptions in note 28 supra.
30 U.C.C. § 9-402(1). Since it will sometimes be necessary to file multiple
copies of the financing statement, the problem of a manual signature
on each may arise. There should be no problem when the parties agree
on using carbons or photocopies. See the definition of "signed" in
U.C.C. § 1-201(39). In the absence of such an agreement, there may
be a problem if the effectiveness of the statement is questioned. See
In re Kane, 55 BERKS COUNTY L. J. 1 (1962).
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ing statement containing only the necessary information: names,
addresses, and signatures of the debtor and secured party, a descrip-
tion of the types or items of collateral, and an indication that the
proceeds or products of collateral are claimed.3 ' No formalities,
such as acknowledgments, are involved. While the description of
the collateral should be as specific as possible, any description is
sufficient if it reasonably identifies what is described.82 This is
notice filing, first introduced nationally by section 13 of the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act.33 It is the only kind of filing which
would be efficiently usable where inventory is being financed on a
revolving basis.
If the financing statement substantially complies with the
Code's requirements, it is effective even though it contains minor
errors which are not seriously misleading.3 4 This provision was
designed to prevent the continuance under the Code of certain
trends in judicial decisions by which excessively technical applica-
tions of filing requirements invalidated secured transactions al-
though the filed statements informed everyone and misled no one
as to the terms of the financing. This provision expresses a
legislative purpose which any modern court should be glad to
implement.
31 U.C.C. § 9-402(3).
32 U.C.C. § 9-110. For a model opinion applying this section, among others,
see National Cash Register Co. v. Firestone & Co., 191 N.E.2d 471 (Mass.
1963). See also In re Goodfriend, CCH INsT. CRED. GUIDE ff 98, 977
(1964), where ". . . inventory of merchandise to be maintained in an
amount not less than $10,000, as per agreement of sale, at seller's whole-
sale cost, contained in the Kiddy and Women's Wear Shop . . ." was
held to be an adequate description to create a security interest in the
entire inventory of the debtor.
33NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-713 (Reissue 1958).
34U.C.C. § 9-402(5). On the interpretation of this section, compare
National Cash Register Co. v. Firestone & Co., 191 N.E.2d 471 (Mass.
1963) (in which it was said that where a debtor's name was given on
the financing statement as "Carroll, Edmund d/b/a Cozy Kitchen" and
the "correct" spelling should have been "Kozy," there was a minor
error not seriously misleading) with In re Excel Stores, CCH INsT.
CPXD. GUIDE, ff 99,406 (1963) (in which the debtor was Excel Stores,
Inc., but the debtor's name on the filed financing statement was
erroneously given as Excel Department Stores, and this was held
to be so misleading as to invalidate the filing). The Excel case arose
on a reclamation petition in bankruptcy. It does not appear that any
creditor was in fact misled by the mistake in the debtor's name, and
since the proper street address was used, it is not clear whether any
alert creditor could have been misled.
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IV. FINANCING INVENTORY
Although the Code does not validate any charges or practices
which are illegal under other statutes, it does permit the parties
to make their own agreement, and that agreement will be effective
between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral, and against
creditors, except as otherwise provided in the Code.35 Of particular
importance, in implementing this provision in the inventory fi-
nancing field, are two sections of the Code. One permits after-
acquired property to be covered by the security agreement,3 and
the other repeals the rule of Benedict v. Rather3 7 by stating that a
security interest is not invalid or fraudulent against creditors be-
cause the debtor may use or commingle or dispose of collateral,
or collect or compromise accounts, or use or commingle proceeds,
without specific accounting to the secured party or replacing
collateral.88 These provisions can be effectively used because of
the notice filing system and the usually applicable first-to-file
priority rule.
The combination of provisions just described is often said to
make possible a "floating lien." This term is not used in the Code
itself, although synonymous expressions appear in the Official Com-
ments.3 9 It is a term which could just as well be put to rest. The
term "floating lien" is used in so many different ways by various
commentators that it is basically meaningless. It is sometimes used
to describe a security interest in all collateral which can possibly
be financed-in the case of a manufacturer, everything from fix-
tures to raw material, work in process, end products, receivables
arising on the sale of inventory, plant equipment, and so on. At
other times, the term is used to describe a security interest in
more limited collateral, which necessarily varies from day to day,
such as a retailer's inventory, or accounts, or chattel paper. The
term in its broadest usage describes a financing transaction of
theoretical interest but of limited practical value because all-
inclusive financing by one secured party is extremely rare. The
term "general security interest" would be more appropriate here.
Where the financing covers inventory alone or accounts alone or
35 U.C.C. § 9-201. See generally, Bunn, Freedom of Contract Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 2 B.C. IND. & COm. L. REv. 59 (1960).
36U.C.C. § 9-204(3).
37268 U.S. 353 (1925).
38 U.C.C. § 9-205.
39 See U.C.C. § 9-205 (Official Comment 1); U.C.C. § 9-204 (Official Com-
ment 3).
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chattel paper alone, it is more descriptive to refer to a security
interest in inventory or accounts or chattel paper.
For a reason which may seem peculiar, the term "lien" could
well be avoided under the Code. If we speak of a "lien," we invite
invidious judicial comparison to the old chattel mortgage-type lien
covering only specifically described property. This kind of trans-
action will, of course, be as common under the Code as it was
before. But the Code covers more kinds of collateral than any com-
bination of earlier statutes, and the broader security interest, to
be effective, simply cannot be analogized to a chattel mortgage
transaction. There is no reason why it should be. However, the use
of an old term invites an old semantic reaction.40 The use of a
newer term invites a look at what the parties are trying to ac-
complish and the statute which makes their contractual arrange-
ment possible.
It should be emphasized that the mere fact that the parties
describe the collateral broadly and all-inclusively does not give
the secured party a financial interest in the collateral greater than
the outstanding balance of the loan. You may have $1,000,000 worth
of collateral for a $1,000 loan, but the secured party's interest in the
collateral will be limited to $1,000.
Moreover, even though there is no legal reason, under the
Code, for the secured party to police revolving collateral, there
may be excellent business reasons for doing so. There is also a
further reason: bankruptcy.
The Code provides that where the secured party gives value
which is to be secured in whole or in part by after-acquired col-
lateral, his interest in the collateral shall be deemed to be taken
for new value and not as security for an antecedent debt if the
debtor acquires his rights in the collateral either in the ordinary
course of business or under a contract of purchase made pursuant
to the security agreement within a reasonable time after new value
is given.4 '
40 This problem is discussed from various viewpoints in Henson, The
Prospective Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code on Commercial
Financing, 1962 U. ILL. L. F. 349; Henson, A Criticism of Criticism: In
re Meaning, 29 FoaDHA L. REV. 553 (1961); Henson, Liens-Seen
Through a Glass, Darkly, 2 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV. 85 (1960); and
Henson, Installment Land Contracts in Illinois: A Suggested Approach
to "Forfeiture," 7 DE PAUL L. REV. 1 (1957).
41 U.C.C. § 9-108. See In re Newkirk Mining Co., 54 BERKS COUNTY L. J.
179 (1962) in which the financer of after-acquired property was able
to reclaim it in bankruptcy.
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Some lawyers have questioned the efficacy of this provision
in bankruptcy. (But then some lawyers have questioned how the
Code could abolish the Supreme Court's dominion rule in Benedict
v. Ratner,42 apparently not realizing that Mr. Justice Brandeis
merely purported to state a rule of New York, not federal, law.
The rule had been clearly "abolished," if it ever had existed, in a
number of states long before the Code.) This Code rule on when
after-acquired property is taken for new value should certainly be
applied in bankruptcy. We are not dealing with the situation
where an unsecured lender decides, on the verge of the debtor's
obviously impending bankruptcy, to take a security interest in
collateral. We are concerned with a situation where a secured
party, intending to be secured, took a continuing security interest
in changing collateral. In a revolving credit-collateral arrange-
ment, the interest in old collateral would terminate on sale and
attach to new, substituted collateral, or to proceeds which, if not
paid over, might be used to pay for the new collateral, so that the
security interest is continuous and traceable.43 No creditor can
possibly be misled here. In no event can the security interest be
asserted for a greater amount than the unpaid balance of the loan.
Then, too, there are a number of criteria for a preference in bank-
ruptcy, of which "antecedent consideration" is but one.44
Financers of revolving collateral may, for instance, continue
to require a daily pay-over in specie-that is, actual checks received
by the debtor, and so on-with a daily crediting and debiting of
the loan balance, but this should, under the Code, be a business
matter and not a legal requirement.
While a security interest usually continues in collateral de-
spite sale or disposition, unless authorized, 45 this is not true in
the case of inventory unless the buyer (in ordinary course of busi-
ness) knows that the sale violates the security agreement.4" It
would be incongruous for a security agreement to prohibit the
sale of inventory in the usual usage of that term, but since "in-
ventory" in the Code includes leased goods, it may well be pos-
sible for a sale to be forbidden or else allowed only in certain
circumstances, although it would be perhaps unusual for a lessor
42268 U.S. 353 (1925).
43 See generally, Kennedy, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code
on Insolvency: Article 9, 67 CoMm. L. J. 113 (1962).
44 See BANKRUPTCY ACT § 60; 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1958).
45 U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
46U.C.C. § 9-307. See also U.C.C. § 9-307 (Official Comment 2).
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of goods also to be a seller of such goods, which is essential in order
to have a "buyer in ordinary course of business. '47 In general, then,
a buyer of inventory will take free of a security interest, and the
secured party acquires, in substitution, a perfected security interest
in the proceeds of sale.48
V. FINANCING PROCEEDS OF INVENTORY
A financer of inventory may, and often will, finance the pro-
ceeds of inventory, in which case the filed financing statement
will disclose this fact.49 The security interest in the proceeds will
continue as long as the financing statement is effective. However,
even though no security interest is claimed in proceeds, the in-
ventory financer has a perfected security interest in the proceeds
for ten days after the debtor receives them.50 During this period
the secured party may file a financing statement, signed only by
himself,51 claiming a security interest in the proceeds, which will
continue the perfected interest for as long as the financing state-
ment is effective.
The term "proceeds" includes whatever is received when col-
lateral or proceeds is sold, exchanged, collected, or otherwise dis-
posed of.52 If an automobile dealer sells a new car, he may receive
a used car in trade, a payment in cash or by check, and an install-
ment contract representing the balance. The cash or check will be
"cash proceeds," and the used car and installment contract will be
"non-cash proceeds. ' 53 If the used car is in turn sold, whatever is
received in exchange for it will in turn be proceeds arising from
the original transaction.
There was, under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, a conflict
in the federal courts (the question seems not to have arisen in the
state courts) on the original financer's right to trace proceeds.54
47 U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
48U.C.C. §§ 9-306(2), (3). Detailed rules applicable in insolvency pro-
ceedings are set forth in U.C.C. § 9-306(4).
49 See the suggested form in U.C.C. § 9-402(3).
50U.C.C. § 9-306(3).
51 U.C.C. § 9-402(2) (b).
52U.C.C. § 9-306(1).
53 Ibid.
.54 The problem arose under UNIFORm TRUST RECEIPTS ACT § 10. On tracing
proceeds under the Code, see Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank v.
Warren Lepley Ford, Inc. (No. 3), 25 Pa. D.& C.2d 395 (Philadelphia
County 1958).
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The financer's right to proceeds was recognized, properly, in In re
Harpeth Motors55 but was not recognized, through a singular ap-
proach to statutory construction, in In re Crosstown Motors. 6 Since
the Code states the inventory financer's claim to proceeds in terms
of a continuously perfected security interest, there can be no ques-
tion about its validity, and the strained kind of construction used
in Crosstown Motors cannot warp the Code out of shape.
The kinds of proceeds which are likely to be separately fi-
nanced (either through assignments for security or sale) are three:
contract rights, accounts, and chattel paper. The first is the least
important.
A contract right is any right to payment under a contract not
yet earned by performance and not evidenced by an instrument
or chattel paper.57 Contract rights could arise under a long-term
contract requiring a manufacturer to make and deliver goods in
installments, with periodic payments on delivery. To finance the
acquisition of the raw materials required to perform the contract,
the manufacturer could assign the right to payment to a financer.
Since a contract right becomes an account as the right to payment
is earned,58 the financer would claim both contract rights and
proceeds arising under the specific contract in the filed financing
statement.59
An account is any right to payment for goods sold or leased or
for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or
chattel paper.00 In other words, this is what is usually called an
account receivable. Perfection of a security interest in accounts
55 135 F. Supp. 863 (M.D. Tenn. 1955).
56 272 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied sub noma, Commercial Credit
Corp. v. Allen, 363 U.S. 811 (1960).
57 U.C.C. § 9-106.
58 See U.C.C. § 9-106 (Official Comment).
59 See U.C.C. § 9-306(1). It has already been noted that the filing require-
ments of the Code do not apply where there is an assignment of accounts
or contract rights which does not (alone or in conjunction with other
assignments to the same assignee) transfer a significant part of the
assignor's outstanding accounts or contract rights (U.C.C. § 9-302(e) ),
and that the Code does not apply to a sale of accounts, contract rights, or
chattel paper as part of a sale of the business out of which they arose,
nor to a transfer of them for collection only. U.C.C. § 9-104(f). It remains
to be noted that the Code does not apply to the transfer of a contract
right to an assignee who is also to do the performance under the contract.
Ibid.
60 U.C.C. § 9-106.
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is accomplished by filing,61 except for this instance where no filing
is necessary: where the assignment is of an insignificant amount
of the assignor's accounts (or contract rights) .62 Where the ac-
counts (or contract rights or chattel paper) are sold as part of the
business out of which they arose, or where the accounts (or con-
tract rights or chattel paper) are assigned for the purpose of col-
lection only, the Code does not apply.63
Chattel paper is a writing or group of writings which evidence
both a monetary obligation and a security interest in or lease of
specific goods.64 The term includes, in traditional terminology, a
simple conditional sale contract or a note and chattel mortgage.
It also includes a lease of chattels which the lessor is transferring
for his own financing purposes, whether or not the lease is in itself
a security agreement. 65 A security interest in chattel paper may
be perfected by filing or by taking possession of the paper.66 It
is recommended that a secured party do both for this reason: where
the secured party files but does not take possession of the paper,
he runs the risk that the debtor may sell the paper to a purchaser
who pays value and takes possession of it in the ordinary course
of business, and if this is done without knowledge of the filed
security interest, the purchaser's interest in the paper has priority
over the interest of the earlier secured party.67 Of course, if it is
desirable for some reason to leave the paper with the debtor, it
can be stamped to show the secured party's interest, and there
could not then be a purchaser without knowledge. It should be
added that a purchaser of chattel paper who gives new value and
takes possession of the paper in the ordinary course of business
has priority over an earlier security interest which is claimed
merely as proceeds of inventory which is subject to a security
interest, even though the purchaser knows that the paper is subject
61 U.C.C. § 9-302(1).
62U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (e).
63 U.C.C. § 9-104 (f). It may bear repetition that Article 9 applies to sales
of, as well as to security interests in, accounts, contract rights, and
chattel paper. U.C.C. §§ 9-102(1) (a), (b), 9-105(1) (c).
64 U.C.C. § 9-105 (1) (b).
65 The Code does not specify when a "lease" is to be deemed a security
agreement, but certain criteria are set out in U.C.C. § 1-201(37). These
criteria have been applied in In re Royer's Bakery, Inc. (No. 2) CCH
INST. CPXD. GUIDE f1 99,274 (1963), and United Rental Equipment Co. v.
Potts & Callahan Contracting Co., 191 A.2d 570 (Md. 1963).
66 U.C.C. §§ 9-304(1), 9-305.
67 U.C.C. § 9-308.
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to the security interest.68 Here the inventory financer can go
against the proceeds received on the sale of the chattel paper.
Where inventory and the proceeds of inventory are separately
financed, what happens when goods which have been sold are
returned or repossessed? If the goods were sold on open account,
the unpaid transferee of the account has a security interest in the
goods as against the transferor, but this interest is subordinate to
a security interest asserted by an unpaid financer of the goods,
whose security interest reattaches to the goods.69 If the sale of
the goods produced chattel paper, an unpaid transferee of the
paper has a security interest which is good against the transferor
and which may or may not be good against the unpaid financer
for whose loan the goods were originally security. The transferee
will take priority as to the goods over the financer of the goods
under the same circumstances in which his interest in the chattel
paper would be superior to the interest of the financer of the
goods in it,70 as detailed in the last paragraph.
CONCLUSION
This discussion does not by any means exhaust the problems
in financing inventory and proceeds. It is merely an introduction
to the field. This kind of financing is handled routinely by bankers
and other financers. In the usual course of events, if a few, simple
mechanical steps are followed-some of them required by law and
others dictated by business judgment-there will be no legal
problems. Unquestionably, the Code provides a simpler, safer basis
for this financing than the pre-Code law of any state.71 This kind
of financing is a necessity in the present economy of this country.
It has been going on for many years even where there were in-
adequate laws or no laws at all to provide a base for it. But, of
course, financers exact a price for their money which is commen-
surate with the risk they think they undertake. The Uniform Com-
merical Code embodies the best current financing practices and
gives them a firm foundation. This is the purpose and the raison
d'etre of commercial law.
08 Ibid.
69U.C.C. §§ 9-306(5) (a), (c).
70 U.C.C. § 9-306 (5) (b).
71 There has been very little litigation under the Code, and if Article 9
was involved it has taken place, for the most part, in bankruptcy courts.
Therefore the decisions are rather generally inaccessible. On the litiga-
tion to date, see Hiller, How the Code's Secured Transactions Have
Fared in the Bankruptcy Courts, 19 Bus. LAw. 57 (1963); Goodwin,
Significant Decisions Interpreting Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 18 Bus. LAw. 777 (1963).
